The ‘Big Three’ at the Potsdam Agreement Conference in Germany, 1945.
From left to right: Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Joseph Stalin. Image Source: National Museum of the U.S. Navy
Are We Shifting Towards a Major Transformation of a New World Order?
By Sara Kim, Staff Writer
The world is currently shifting. A major contender on the global playing field, China, is positioning itself with a new vision for the world order. The question is no longer if a new order will emerge, but how it will take shape, and to what extent it will ‘succeed’. Furthermore, are the current advocates of the Liberal International Order (LIO), notably the U.S. and the West, ready to accept this possibility?
Dr. John Kirton, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Toronto, defines the LIO ideology as “… centred on the principles, the values articulated in the charters of the defining international institutions created to govern the post-World War II world.”
The creation of institutions like the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 has advanced this order, establishing the ‘norms’ and liberal ideologies that have dominated international politics.
Fundamentally, the LIO was created with the hope that the international community would benefit from a rules-based system of governance. However, according to state leaders and academic scholars, this ideology has not withstood the test of time; from the 2008 U.S. stock market crash to Brexit, to growing political polarization and the rise of populism within states, monumental global events have exposed the cracks in the LIO.
Has the international community as a whole truly reaped the benefits of the LIO? Who are the emerging challengers to this system? Are we witnessing a small temporary shift in the world order, or does it reflect a deeper need for reform and adaptation to new global realities?
The ‘Highs’ and ‘Lows’ of LIO
As a rules-based system, the LIO emphasizes international cooperation, interdependence, and liberal values—such as human rights, development, free trade, and multilateralism.
However, a notable contradiction of the LIO lies in its promotion of free markets and ‘equal’ opportunity often portrayed as a pathway to prosperity for states and their citizens. A common criticism of the order is that democratic and Western states have long repealed its benefits, often excluding those that do not embrace democratic values and practices, leaving many to lag in a fast-paced global rat race.
This exclusion manifests in various ways, particularly through military interventions aimed at weakening states perceived as ‘threats’ to LIO principles. According to Dr. Caleb Pomeroy, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, this exclusionary trend is often fueled by ‘threat inflation,’ where perceived dangers are dramatized to justify illiberal actions abroad under the guise of safeguarding the liberal order.
Such practices reveal a significant flaw in the LIO: rather than serving as a beacon of equal opportunities and cooperation, it often perpetuates a double standard in promoting stability, shaped by discriminatory beliefs inherent in liberal democracies. Instead of effectively addressing these disparities, the states that ‘uphold’ the LIO tend to mitigate the negative effects of inequality rather than implementing practical grassroots solutions.
Challenges and New Contenders
Over the past decade, protectionism, the shielding of domestic goods from foreign competition through tariffs to support local industries, has significantly contributed to the erosion of the LIO. Former President of the United States Donald Trump exemplifies this principle in his policies, pledging a 60% tariff on Chinese imports and 20% on all other foreign imports if re-elected in 2024.
Protectionism extends beyond the U.S.; China ranks second in adopting protectionist measures, followed by G7 member states, including Germany and Italy. This rise in protectionism detrimentally affects global trade liberalization, contradicting the ‘opening doors’ and free market ideology foundational to the liberal order.
Moreover, considering that the LIO is over 80 years old, it grapples with potential challengers to the order, notably non-Western powers. China has emerged as a global economic powerhouse and is projected to surpass the U.S. GDP by 2050. The ‘threat’ perceived by advocates of the LIO, particularly U.S. policymakers, is largely rooted in China’s status as an autocratic state, which is seen as ‘incompatible’ with the liberal democratic values central to the order.
Aside from autocracies, flawed democracies such as Brazil and India are also navigating their evolving roles within the LIO. Though these states are not in direct opposition with liberal democratic values, they are transforming the global economic and trade landscape, which has been historically dominated by Western powers. Their growing influence signals a shift away from the assumption that the global economy is primarily shaped by states with strong commitments to liberal democratic ideologies.
The Future of the Liberal International Order: Reform or Collapse?
The question still remains: can the LIO adapt to accommodate emerging influences, or are we witnessing the gradual decline of a once-dominant global order?
The leading states, particularly the U.S., must reform and adapt to changing times. No system can last forever; it must be challenged to progress. States and policies that challenge the principles of the LIO reveal critical weaknesses that can be addressed if advocating states truly care about its preservation.
The failure of the U.S. and its democratic allies to acknowledge the rise of autocratic regimes likely comes from the denial that the ‘other’ can contend with ‘us’. If the pioneering states of the LIO merely observe perceived threats from the sidelines without adapting, then the preservation of the order is in jeopardy. This has been evident over the past few years, creating opportunities for emerging powers to dominate in the international system.
Given these shifts, one might ask: is it still accurate to call the current system the ‘Liberal International Order’? While this order may continue to shape global relations, it’s possible that no single order needs to dominate. Instead, we could be witnessing the emergence of multiple, coexisting orders, reflecting what IR scholars like to call ‘multipolarity’.
In this context, perhaps it is time to reconsider whether a “rules-based” order can truly function in an increasingly disordered global landscape.
